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Summary: In many European Union (EU) member countries, the financial turmoil that started in 2008 resulted in a banking and/
or sovereign debt crisis. The EU did not have dedicated tools to handle the situation and it became clear that neither the IMF 
loans, nor the ad hoc intergovernmental loans provided satisfactory solutions. This motivated the establishment of the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM). In this study, we compared the lending activity of the IMF and the ESM, their institutional 
background, and using panel regression methods we investigated the effect of EFSM-ESM loans on monthly sovereign bond 
yield premia. Results: The ESM programmes worked against bond market divergence, yield premia decreased, and they moved 
more closely together – which is a precondition of an efficient eurozone-wide monetary policy. Since EFSM-ESM bonds are 
guaranteed by euro area member states, it fulfils the solidarity principle of the optimum currency area, and with the help of 
EFSM-ESM programmes, sovereign defaults have been successfully avoided.
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The eurozone, created by the core states of the 
european union, did not have an institutional 
and financial background to deal with bank-
ing and sovereign debt crises at the time of 
its establishment. Because of this, member 
states tried to handle the effects of the global 
financial crisis that started in 2008 with funds 
from the international Monetary Fund (iMF) 
and ad-hoc intergovernmental loans at first. 
Later it became clear that this was insufficient, 
both politically and financially, and that a 
permanent, dedicated fund was required, so 
the european stability Mechanism (esM) 
was created. in this study we compare the 
iMF, an institution with a history of nearly 
75 years, and the esM, established with an 
intergovernmental treaty after 2012, and 
we explore the effects of the esM on bond 
markets.
Programmes to transform the esM into a 
‘european Monetary Fund’ as we see it in Jean-
Claude Juncker’s ‘sixth scenario’ and in com-
munication from the european Commission 
in 20171 and the Managing director of the 
esM in 20182, also prompt a comparison of 
the two multilateral funds used for crisis man-
agement (Losoncz, 2017).
in case of the iMF, the obligation of con-
vertibility according to section (4) of Arti-E-mail address:  kiss.gabor.david@eco.u-szeged.hu
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cle Viii of the Articles of Agreement needs to 
be highlighted, as its aim these days is to en-
sure the free movement of capital and thus fi-
nancial account liberalisation. Meanwhile the 
esM, with a reverse approach, provides an in-
stitutionalised solution for easing the tensions 
caused by the liberalisation of capital move-
ments. it is important to state, however, that 
these organisations can only manage certain 
crises, acting like a firewall to stop them from 
spreading (Báger, 2017), considering that in a 
country with a population of several million, 
it takes a lot of economic and political inter-
actions to create and to come out of a crisis.
The present paper focuses only on the eu-
rozone countries: we examined the chang-
es in the long term bond market yields with 
monthly time-series between 2006 and 2018, 
looking for factors that work against the di-
vergence caused by the crisis, using a dynamic 
panel regression model.
in our study, an overview of how the esM 
was created is followed by a comparison of the 
framework of the lending activities of the iMF 
and the esM, then we present the data and 
methodology used for the empirical analysis, 
and finally we assess the results and draw the 
conclusions.
ThEoRETICaL baCkGRoUnD
if a state is not able or not willing to meet its 
payment obligations, it typically can’t sell the 
sovereign bonds meant to finance government 
deficits and maturing sovereign debt at a 
reasonable yield, and there are problems with 
interest payment as well (Losoncz, 2014). in 
this case, the options include rescheduling 
with the same present value, restructuring 
while decreasing the present value, and 
partial remittance. The country in trouble can 
negotiate with its sovereign creditors within 
the Paris Club and with its private creditors 
in the London Club (if it is not too atomised). 
Another option is to take intergovernmental 
loans, provided there is a willing partner. After 
the Bretton Woods conference (1944), the 
iMF became the institutionalised framework 
for sovereign multilateral lending. The iMF 
can diversify the sources of financing and 
lending, and it has the competencies to set the 
conditions of the latter. This means that when 
a country switches to iMF financing from 
market financing, it is at the expense of the 
collective sovereign debt of the iMF member 
states.
A sovereign default may easily lead to a 
banking crisis and vice versa: as the default risk 
of sovereign bonds increases, it jeopardises the 
solvency and liquidity of the banking system, 
while a too costly bank consolidation may lead 
to a situation where sovereign bonds are hard 
to sell on a market that has liquidity problems 
in the first place. A capital increase meant to 
absorb the credit losses of the banking system 
can easily get stalled, or, with surging sover-
eign debt, it may also drag down the country 
concerned (Botos, 2006; Botos, 2014; Laeven, 
2011; Reinhart et al., 2011).
The european stability Mechanism (esM) 
was established in 20123 with an internation-
al treaty outside of eu legislation (as con-
firmed later by the european Court of Justice 
in the Pringle case) to protect the stability of 
the eurozone, as an instrument of economic 
policy (Kálmán, 2016; Benczes, 2014; Várnay, 
2016). The eurozone must ensure free capi-
tal flow, which stems from the theory of Op-
timum Currency Area (Mundell, 1961), and 
at the same time, resulting from the impossi-
ble trinity, it must also ensure irreversibly fixed 
exchange rates and the maintenance of a com-
mon monetary policy, while there are provi-
sions against exit, no bailout and sovereign de-
fault (Losoncz, 2017; Marján, Buda, 2014; 
Benczes, 2011). The free flow of capital is es-
sential, so we will examine this from two as-
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pects: how it brought the idea of a banking 
union to centre stage and how this effects the 
convergence of bond market yields.
due to free capital flows and the free pro-
vision of services, financial crises spread more 
easily through parent banks (Árvai et al., 
2009) and the balance sheet total of certain 
bank groups are now comparable to the gross 
national product of member states. Because of 
this, the aim of macroprudential policy4 is to 
mitigate system-level crises, to prevent exces-
sive credit growth, to manage liquidity risks 
and to avoid excessive risk-taking. This is also 
the aim of the Banking union, which focus-
es mostly on the eurozone but is also open to 
other member states, through the direct super-
vision of banks that are significant on a sys-
tem-level (single supervisory Mechanism), 
and through the common resolution fund and 
deposit insurance fund (Mérő, 2017). some of 
the resources provided by the esM, described 
in the following sections, were also spent on 
bank consolidation by the recipient countries, 
which, again, underlines the significance of 
the institutional deepening mentioned before.
in our work we focus on the effects of the 
introduction of the esM on bond markets. 
The Maastricht criteria5, on which the euro-
zone is based, included the requirement of the 
convergence of long-term bond yields. Bearce 
(2002), however, raised the possibility of a re-
verse process (the divergence of yields). Con-
sidering that members of the eurozone issue 
sovereign bonds with different credit ratings 
(anywhere between B- and AAA ratings), a 
global decline in risk-appetite may lead to a 
safety trap, increasing demand for low-risk as-
sets, resulting in their near-zero returns (Hor-
váth, szini, 2015). This, in itself, may increase 
the yield spread over member states with AAA 
rating.
Bond yields must be affected by the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy as 
well, both in case of repo and final purchase 
transactions. Along with near-zero key interest 
rates, the european Central Bank (eCB) in-
troduced longer repo operations at first, then, 
from 2010, together with member state cen-
tral banks6, it had a series of bond purchase 
programmes that covered asset-backed securi-
ties (ABs)7, residential and commercial mort-
gage-backed securities (MBs) and sovereign 
bonds purchased on secondary markets – espe-
cially after 2015.8, 9 Figure 1 shows the chang-
es of the amount of bonds owned by the eCB.
in addition, the eCB purchases sovereign 
bonds in the Outright Monetary transactions 
(OMt) programme if the eurozone member 
state concerned receives esM (or previously 
eFsF) financing according to a Memorandum 
of understanding that the state concluded ear-
lier with the Commission and if it complies 
with the economic policy provisions laid down 
in it (Várnay, 2016).
This means that if we want to examine how 
the esM affects bond yields, we need to take a 
look at the eCB’s bond purchase programme 
as well, which is best illustrated by the increas-
ing amount of bonds in the balance sheet of 
the central bank.
Comparing the IMF and the ESM
it makes the institutional background even 
more complex that the european Commission 
has always involved the iMF as a partner in 
the crisis management process (Marján, Buda, 
2014; Losoncz, 2014). This involvement is 
justified by the high quota of the eurozone 
member states, their considerable voting power 
and credit facilities. in the iMF, according to 
the latest, fifteenth amendment accepted in 
2008, it is a 19 percent quota share10 (us 14.7 
percent), which is sdR 103.8 bn. in addition, 
euro area countries contribute to the NAB 
(New Arrangements to Borrow) and GAB (Ge-
neral Arrangements to Borrow) funds, which 
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constitute the source of financing for the iMF, 
with 36 percent and 26 percent respectively.11 
Which means it would not be rational not to 
rely on these available resources.
On the other hand, except for the recon-
struction after the second world war and some 
short detours (and the support provided to 
countries during the political transition of the 
1990s), the iMF did not focus on european 
and euro area countries. Considering this, it is 
understandable that the ecofin and the euro-
pean Commission became committed to the 
establishment of an own crisis management 
fund (more than one, with the bank resolu-
tion fund). Another important difference is 
that the esM admittedly has no independent 
decision-making powers, it is only responsible 
for the availability of funds [an 85 percent ma-
jority of members is required for access (Móra, 
2013)].
The iMF lends the resources provided by 
the member states for a maximum duration of 
ten years, while the esM can set a 50 year re-
payment period for its loans, for which it rais-
es capital from the bonds it issues with mem-
ber state guarantees. This is also useful from 
the aspect of how sovereign debts affected by 
the consolidation are spread over time. Table 1 
shows the main differences between the lend-
ing facilities.
esM bonds are officially recognised as 
bonds issued by a sovereign, supranational 
Agency (ssA), which receive a 0 percent risk 
weight according to the Basel ii document12. 
in addition, the european Banking Authority 
recognises it as an ‘extremely high quality liq-
uid asset’, and it is accepted by the eCB and 
the Bank of england as collateral. esM sells 
bonds globally through 41 institutional inves-
tors, while short-term notes provided for the 
Figure 1
Changes of the amount of bonds owned by the eCb
Source: edited by the authors based on the ECb statistical database
Sovereign bonds (m EUR)
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recapitalisation of the banking sector may only 
be used in the repo markets as collateral.13 The 
interest rates of the bonds issued are built in 
the interest rates of the loans provided to the 
recipient countries, together with the commis-
sion that ensures the operation of the esM 
and the stand-by fee.
The lending facility of the eMs can be 
seen as some ‘bad eurozone bond’, and its ac-
ceptance is sweetened by the related sovereign 
guarantees, the solvency capital requirement 
benefits and the fact that they are accepted as 
collateral (sági, 2018). From an institutional 
aspect, it seemed an acceptable hybrid solu-
tion in addition to the politically less popular 
other options, namely ad-hoc bilateral loans, 
the ‘euro bond’ covering the whole euro area, 
and the bonds issued by the european Com-
mission (european Financial stabilisation 
Mechanism). The establishment of the esM, 
however, clearly indicated that in addition to 
the emergency reforms of the stability and 
Growth Pact, member states were ready for 
showing solidarity that complies with the pro-
hibition of sovereign default and for a deepen-
ing integration (Benczes, Rezessy, 2013; Kuta-
si, 2012). it is a question, however, also raised 
by Benczes and Rezessy (2013), and Vigvári 
(2015), what will happen if a larger member 
state gets into trouble.
Member states receiving ESM funding
The esM provides funding to member states 
through several channels: conventional loans 
(to ireland, Portugal, Greece and Cyprus), 
loans for the recapitalisation of the bank-
Table 1




Stand-By Arrangement (SBA): 1–2 years 
(3¼–5 years)   
Extended Fund Facility (EFF): 3–4 years  
(4½–10 years)    
Flexible Credit Line (FCL): 1–2 years  
(3½–5 years)   
Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL):  
0.5–2 years
2–3 years (~20 years grace period, 
45 years final maturity)
Currency of loan SDR (41.71% USD, 30.93% EUR, 10.92 




Based on quotas European Commission, Ecofin, 
with 85% qualified majority
Financing Funds from member states (General 
Arrangements to Borrow and New 
Arrangements to Borrow), accessible with 
85% qualified majority
Bond issuance (EUR 500 
bn) backed by member state 
guarantees (EUR 80 bn)
Note: without loans to poor countries 
Source: IMF, ESM websites
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ing system (spain); the programme in which 
sovereign bonds are purchased on the primary 
and secondary markets and the precautionary 
liquidity line have not yet been used. in this 
subsection we describe the use and maturity 
profile of loans provided through the eFsF/
esM, relying on data from the website of the 
organisation.
Greece returned to full market financing in 
2018 after the first loan agreement was made 
in 2010 to manage the crisis. in this agreement 
Greece first received bilateral loans of euR 
52.9 bn and a loan of euR 20.1 bn from the 
iMF, which was followed by a euR 141.8 bn 
eFsF (and a euR 12 bn iMF) package be-
tween 2012 and 2015, then an additional 
amount of euR 61.9 bn was allocated within 
the esM. in the case of the eFsF, it must be 
emphasised how the private sector (especially 
banks) were involved in crisis management: in 
May 2012, 97 percent (euR 197 bn) of pri-
vately owned bonds were subject to a 53.5 per-
cent haircut, in which Greek sovereign bonds 
were swapped with eFsF bonds, the maturi-
ty of which was later extended. After that, 55 
percent of Greece’s sovereign debt was held by 
the esM, with an average maturity period of 
32.25 years and a 2034–2060 repayment pe-
riod. in November 2018, a decision was made 
to extend the weighted average maturity of all 
eFsF loan tranches by ten years, which, to-
gether with the low variable borrowing rates 
(average: 1.62 percent), may result in signifi-
cant debt reduction by 2060.14 58 percent of 
esF funds were spent on debt servicing, 18 
percent on building a cash buffer, 11.3 percent 
on arrears clearance and 8.7 percent on bank 
recapitalisation.
Cyprus first received a loan from the iMF 
(euR 1 bn) in 2012, then from the esM 
(euR 6.3 bn), with an average maturity pe-
riod of 14.9 years. The repayment period is 
from 2026 to 2031, the average variable bor-
rowing rate is 0.91 percent. euR 1.5 bn of the 
loans was used for the recapitalisation of the 
banking system.
Portugal needed iMF-eFsF-esM support 
between 2011 and 2014, receiving euR 26 bn 
from each, and euR 12 bn of this was used for 
the recapitalisation of three large banks. Bor-
rowing rates vary, the average rate is 1.76 per-
cent, the average maturity period is 20.8 years, 
the repayment period is between 2025–2040.
From 2010 to 2012, ireland needed loans 
from the iMF (euR 22.5 bn), the europe-
an Commission (euR 22.5 bn), the eFsF 
(euR 17.7 bn), the united Kingdom (euR 
3.8 bn), sweden (euR 0.6 bn) and denmark 
(euR 0.4 bn). The average maturity period of 
the eFsF loans is 20.8 years, the repayment 
period is between 2029 and 2042, and most 
recently the variable borrowing rates were at 
1.79 percent. The funds were mostly used for 
financing the budget deficit, and a smaller part 
was used for the recapitalisation of the bank-
ing system.
spain only used esM funds for the recap-
italisation of the banking system. The total 
amount between 2012 and 2013 was euR 
41.3 bn, with maturity between 2025 and 
2027 (the average variable interest rate is 1.11 
percent), capital repayment starts in 2022, but 
euR 17.612 bn has already been repaid vol-
untarily. The iMF was not involved, as at the 
time it did not have facilities suitable for the 
recapitalisation of the banking system. esM 
funds were managed by the restructuring fund 
of the spanish government, Fondo de Ree-
structuración Ordenada Bancaria, and it in-
volved 8 banks. An asset management fund 
was also established.
Overall, the esM provided loans with vari-
able interest rates (with the exception of the fa-
cility provided to Greece, amended in 2018), 
not exposing itself to market interest risks. On 
the other hand, it launched programmes that 
span over decades, sometimes 50 years, and the 
economic policy of the recipient countries are 
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now under strict supervision until 75 percent 
of the loans are repaid (Ódor, P. Kiss, 2011; 
török, 2018). every member state involved in 
these assistance programmes managed to re-
turn to direct capital market financing, which 
suggests the programme is accepted.
METhoDoLoGy, MoDEL anD DaTa
in our study we used GARCH models to model 
the autoregression and heteroskedasticity of 
the time series, used the dynamic conditional 
correlation (dCC) model to analyse the 
correlation of bond market yields, and we used 
dynamic panel regression on monthly bond 
market data to analyse how the allocation of 
the eFsF-esM funds influenced the change 
in yield premia over the German benchmark.
When iMF or esM financing is used, the 
state concerned replaces bond market financ-
ing, partially or wholly, with international fi-
nancing, then it later returns to market sourc-
es. to serve domestic private and institutional 
investors (the banking system, insurance com-
panies, investment funds, etc.) bond markets 
need to be sustained in the course of these pro-
grammes, and the changes in the yields there 
clearly indicate the market’s assessment of the 
viability of the consolidation programme.
Model
Based on Bearce (2002), we talk about bond 
market divergence if the yield spread starts 
to increase, meaning market operators stop 
considering the eurozone as a homogeneous 
unit. Considering the strength of the German 
economy and the AAA rating of German 
sovereign bonds by s&P, it is useful to 
calculate yield premia over those. The change 
of the yield premia may considerably depend 
on its own past value (we can assume there is 
autocorrelation) and on the change in the co-
movement of the two yields. The conditional 
standard deviation of the bond yield may also 
be important, as it expresses the uncertainty 
of pricing. The sovereign debt financing by 
the eFsF-esM and the bond purchases of 
the eCB (which fine tune monetary policy 
transmission) should also be examined.
Our model takes all this into consideration 
and is as follows:
∆ln(rd–rDE)t = α∆ln(rd–rDE)t–1 + ω  
+ β∆DCCd–DE,t + γ∆σd,t + δdummyESM,t  
+ μdummyIMF,t +  θ∆lnECBt + εt
(1)
Where ∆ln(rd–rDE) is the logarithmic change 
of the yield premium over German sovereign 
bonds,15 ω is the constant, ∆DCCd–DE,t is the 
change of the dynamic conditional correlation 
calculated with German sovereign bonds ∆σd,t 
is the change of conditional standard devia-
tion, the fact that esM or earlier eFsF sourc-
es were used16 is expressed with the dummy 
variable δdummyESM,t, the existence of iMF 
funds is expressed by the μdummyIMF,t dummy 
variable, ∆lnECBt  is the logarithmic change of 
the amount of sovereign bonds in the balance 
sheet of the eCB, and εt  is the error term.
Based on the assumptions, the loosening 
of the previous close co-movement of yields 
is expected to result in an increase in the yield 
premium, and similarly, in an increase in the 
standard deviation (riskiness) of bond yields. 
The funds regularly transferred by the eFsF-
esM and the eCB’s sovereign bond purchas-
es were meant to counterbalance this process.
The methodology of  dynamic panel 
regression
Cross-sectional analyses at a certain point in 
time often lead to distorted and inconsistent 
estimates. using panel data, we can examine 
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the dynamics of the effects as well, getting 
a more accurate picture of the effects of the 
processes that evolve in space and time. 
unobserved time invariant and/or individual 
invariant factors may result in endogeneity, 
which can be filtered out with adding fixed 
effects to the model (Balázsi et al., 2014). 
Our sample contains every country that has 
an effect on the research question, so it is 
not a random sample, which also calls for the 
application of the fixed-effect model (Judson, 
Owen 1999).
if the result variable (yit) is autocorrelated, 
the result variable’s (yit) lagged values (yit–1) 
need to be added to the regression equation as 
an explanatory variable (Balázsi et al., 2014). 
ignoring the autocorrelation of the result var-
iable would be a mistake similar to leaving 
another important explanatory variable out 
from the model. so it is the relatively large 
number of observed variables, the relatively 
short time series and the presence of the auto-
correlated result variable that calls for the use 
of dynamic panel models. As opposed to stat-
ic panel models, dynamic panel models use 
the lagged values of the result variable as an 
explanatory variable. using a lagged depend-
ent variable as a regressor is contrary to strict 
exogeneity, as the lagged dependent variable 
is necessarily correlated with the error term, 
and as a result the techniques used in stat-
ic models like fixed-effect estimating func-
tions lead to inconsistent estimates. if some 
fixed-effect structure is inserted in a dynamic 
model, the resulting estimating function re-
sults in an inconsistent estimate in N (num-
ber of observations) for a fixed T (length of 
the time series) (Balázsi et al., 2014). to deal 
with this, in our study we used the follow-
ing dynamic panel regression, based on Arel-
lano and Bond (1991). The GMM procedure 
of Arellano and Bond (1991) uses all availa-
ble lags as the instruments of the differenced 
lagged dependent variable.
The relatively large number of observed 
variables, the relatively short time series and 
the presence of the autocorrelated result var-
iable call for the use of dynamic panel mod-
els. The method is based on an AR(1) process, 
where, to deal with the problem of endoge-
neity, the result variable yit  is explained by its 
own lagged values, using the variable specific 
μi and the zero mean value vit uncorrelated er-
ror terms as customary with fixed effect panel 
regressions (Blundell, Bond, 1998; Arellano, 
Bond, 1991):
yit= αyit–1+ μi + vit, i=1,…, n, t = 1,…, Ti. (2)
Which is supplemented by the introduction of 
the explanatory variables in the model:
yit= αyit–1+ βxit + μi +vit, i = 1,…, n, t = 1,…, Ti. (3)
with the following restrictions:
yit= βxit + fi + ξit, where ξit = αξit–1+ vi  
and μi = (1–α) fi, |α|<1.
(4)
Overidentification occurs when there are 
more variables in the model then required for 
the estimation. The potential overidentifica-
tion of the model was tested with the sargan 
test, the null hypothesis of which states that 
model parameters are identified via a priori re-
strictions on the coefficients (if p>0.05, the 
output is acceptable).
GARCH models
Problems arising from autoregression and 
heteroskedasticity are mostly handled with the 
generalised ARCH models, i.e. the GARCH 
(Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity) models. in the GARCH(p, 
q) model p and ε2 represent the lookback 
period of the error term, q and σ2 represent 
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the lookback period of standard deviation, 
αi represents the effects of current news 
on conditional variance, and βi represents 
volatility persistence, i.e. the shock of current 
news on past information (Kiss, 2017):
σt
2 = ω + ∑ pi=1 αi ε
2
t–i + ∑ 
q
i=1 βi σ 
2
t-i. (5)
The basic GARCH(1,1) model assumes that 
present volatility depends on past volatility 
and yields, and that there is no difference be-
tween market reactions to positive and neg-
ative shocks. With asymmetric GARCH 
models – for example: GJR-GARCH – the 
leverage effect can be introduced to the mod-
el, which states that negative yields (losses) are 
more frequently followed by volatile periods. 
The significance of asymmetry is to grasp the 
stronger reactions to negative news. The GJR-
GARCH model defines asymmetric reactions 
with an S dummy variable (Kiss 2017):
{S –t-i = 1, ha εt–i < 0  S –t-i = 0, ha εt–i  ≥ 0, (6)
where the GJR-GARCH(p,o,q) model can be 
written as follows:

















where α1 > 0 (i=1,…, p), γi +αi > 0 (i=1,…,o), βi ≥ 0 
(i=1,…,q),αi + 0,5 γi + βk < 1 (i=1,…, p, j = 1,…, 
o, k = 1,…,q). Based on the minimum value 
of the Bayesian information Criterion 
(BiC), calculated with the maximum 
likelihood estimation, we optimised every 
possible combination of the values of the p, 
o and q parameters (p=1,2; o=0,1; q=1,2), 
and as a result, in 58 percent of the cases it 
was the GJR-GARCH(1,1,1) model, in the 
other 42 percent it was the GARCH(1,1) 
model that fit optimally. For the sake of 
comparability, we used the estimations 
of the GJR-GARCH(1,1,1) model on the 
whole sample.
to demonstrate the convergence or diver-
gence of bond yields, the change of correla-
tion over time needs to be verified, for which 
the suitable tool is the dynamic conditional 
correlation model (dCC-model(1,1,1)), by 
which heteroskedasticity can be modelled. 
Based on Engle (2002), the dynamic condi-
tional correlation model (dCC model) mod-
els the conditional σ2it variance of time series 
with a rt ‖ Φt–1~N(0,Ht ] yield and Φt–1 infor-
mation available at any t–1 time:
[ σ 2i,t σi,j,t ] = ∑pi=1 αi,j [ e2i,t–p ei,j,t–p ] +σi,j,t σ 2j,t ei,j,t–p e2i,t–p





where the i=1:N–1 index is the logarithmic 
change of the 10-year bonds of the euro area 
states, and the j=N index is the logarithmic 
change of German 10-year bonds.
Presentation of  data
data from the eCB statistical database are 
monthly data between January 2006 and 
November 2018 regarding 10-year sovereign 
bonds. From this, we first we calculated 
the recipient countries’ yield premia over 
German 10-year bonds. Figure 2 shows the 
yield premia of the countries in the eFsM-
esM programme. As a result of the 2008–
2009 global financial crisis, its repercussions 
and the sovereign debt crisis of the eurozone, 
the yield premia of the peripheral countries 
of the eurozone increased significantly. 
There was a risk that strongly rising yields 
unjustified by fundamentals in the countries 
that were the most affected by the debt crisis 
would lead to a self-fulfilling sovereign crisis, 
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i.e. to a situation where rising yields on 
their own, in parallel with high outstanding 
debts, significantly impair the sustainability 
of sovereign debt (Krekó et al., 2012). in 
case of yield premia, the largest surge was in 
Greece, while it was spanish yields that stayed 
the closest to German yields. After 2012, the 
effects of the crisis management of the iMF 
and the institutionalised crisis management 
of the eurozone were visible, and so were the 
effects of the non-conventional monetary po-
licy tools of the eCB, which helped decrease 
the yield premia of the countries on the 
periphery.
The eCB announced its securities Mar-
kets Programme (sMP) in May 2010, fol-
lowing a significant increase in the premia of 
longer-term sovereign bonds in euro area pe-
riphery countries (Krekó et al., 2012). With-
in the sMP, the eCB purchased long-term 
sovereign bonds for euR 218 bn (Ghysels 
et al., 2014). The sMP was successful in the 
short term, as the yields of long term sover-
eign bonds decreased in the vulnerable econ-
omies of the eurozone, but the long term ef-
fects of the programme cannot be separated 
from other market effects (Krekó et al., 2012; 
Ghysels et al., 2014). in addition, the eCB 
launched its largest-scale asset purchase pro-
gramme to date in early 2015: in the APP (ex-
panded asset purchase programme), signif-
icant amounts of eurozone sovereign bonds 
were purchased.
Figure 2 shows the yield premia of the 10-
year sovereign bonds of the recipient coun-
tries, Cyprus, spain, Greece, ireland and Por-
tugal, over German 10-year sovereign bonds, 
while Figure 3 shows the dynamic condition-
Figure 2
yield premia of 10-year sovereign bonds of Cyprus, spain, greeCe,  
ireland and portugal over german 10-year sovereign bonds
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al correlation of the German sovereign bond, 
modelled with the dCC-procedure. An exam-
ination of the co-movement of sovereign bond 
yields reveals that the 2008 financial crisis sig-
nificantly disrupted the yield convergence that 
characterised the pre-crisis period. As the debt 
crisis deepened in europe, the sovereign bond 
yields of the periphery countries diverged from 
German sovereign bonds, with significant vola-
tility (sági, 2012). in most countries examined 
(except for ireland) there were periods with 
negative co-movement occurred (in opposite 
directions). in Greece, this negative co-move-
ment was of lasting nature, which was most-
ly caused by the steadily high yield premia. The 
yield of the sovereign bonds of Cyprus was less 
convergent before the crisis, and after the cri-
sis there was a long term, slight, negative co-
movement.
to deal with problems arising from au-
toregression and heteroskedasticity, we fit the 
GJR-GARCH model on the elements of the 
time series that contained the bond yields 
of the countries examined. The asymmetric 
GJR-GARCH(1,1,1) model was necessary for 
the bond yields, where the number of lags is 
1 for innovation, asymmetry and volatility. it is 
clear from Figure 4 that the conditional stand-
ard deviation of bond yields significantly in-
creased after the crisis, especially in the case of 
Greek and irish 10-year sovereign bonds. Af-
ter 2015, as a result of the market uncertainty 
around the eurozone, the ongoing Greek debt 
crisis and the non-conventional tools (expand-
ed asset purchase programme, APP) used to 
manage these situations, the conditional vola-
tility of the bond yields increased in the coun-
tries examined.
Figure 3
dCC of sovereign bonds of Cyprus, spain, greeCe, ireland and portugal 
CalCulated with german 10-year sovereign bonds
Source: ECb, own calculation (Matlab, MFE toolbox)
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in the case of the sovereign bonds of Cy-
prus, we can see that the conditional stand-
ard deviation returns to the expected value – 
we got the same results with the alternative 
GARCH(1,1) model17, which suggests that 
the result is characteristic of the time series. 
This, however, had an impact on the results of 
the dCC as well.
RESULTS
We ran the model on the original monthly 
time series, and on the averaged quarterly time 
series calculated from that to compensate for 
the distortion caused by the discrete capital 
transfers provided by the esM (see Table 2). 
The sample covered the whole eurozone, and 
we also examined the panel with the countries 
participating in the eFsF-esM-programme. 
From the coefficients in the dynamic pa-
nel regressions, the ones with positive value 
represent the variables encouraging divergence, 
and the ones with negative value represent the 
variables encouraging convergence.
Based on table 2 we can establish that the 
model applied is correct, as the increase in 
the correlation led to the decrease in the yield 
premia over German sovereign bonds – mean-
ing there was convergence (d_DCC variable). 
Meanwhile the increase in the conditional 
standard deviation calculated from the logarith-
mic change of the bond yield typically resulted 
in the decrease of the premium (d_standardde-
viation variable).18 The existence of eFsF-esM 
transfers also had a decreasing effect on yield 
premia, which means it worked against diver-
gence. According to the model, the funds re-
Figure 4
Conditional standard deviation of bond yields –  
gJr-garCh(1,1,1)
Source: ECb, own calculation (Matlab, MFE toolbox)
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ceived through the eFsF-esM achieved their 
theoretic effect, they had a decreasing effect on 
the yield premia over German sovereign bonds 
in the recipient countries, contributing to the 
sustainability of the sovereign debt financing 
of the countries examined (dummy-ESM vari-
able). The effect of iMF resources can only be 
detected in the monthly data; in this case, the 
presence of iMF resources decreased the yield 
premia over German sovereign bonds, i.e. they 
led to the convergence of yield levels (dummy_
IMF variable). in a peculiar way, the dln_ECB 
variable, which represents the increase in the 
amount of sovereign bonds held by the eCB, 
contributed toward divergence in every case 
– this effect needs to be explored separately, 
which is beyond the scope of this study.
it needs to be emphasised that there is no 
significant difference between the results from 
monthly and quarterly data, and between the 
Table 2
Changes in the bond market premia of member states partiCipating  
in the efsf and esm programmes
 Quarterly data monthly data
 total esm total esm
variable coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
dln_premium –0.0497 0.4965 –0.0750 0.3621 –0.0481 0.418 0.1829 0.0003***
Constant –0.0052 0.0000*** –0.0087 0.0000*** –0.0007 0.0000*** –0.0006 0.0000***
d_DCC –0.1443 0.0000*** –0.1567 0.0006*** 0.0213 0.6657 –0.0397 0.2025
d_standard-
deviation
–0.3579 0.0000*** –0.9515 0.0397** –0.4201 0.0001*** 0.4545 0.0019***
dummy_ESM –0.0979 0.0000*** –0.0953 0.0000*** –0.0247 0.0502* –0.0123 0.4342
dummy_IMF –0.0967 0.3452 –0.0887 0.4036 –0.0361 0.0000*** –0.0217 0.0271**
dln_ECb 0.1240 0.0215** 0.0987 0.2593 0.2530 0.0000*** 0.1478 0.0362**
Sargan test  0.5276  0.3318  0.9995  0.8001
corr(d_DCC,res) 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.09
corr(d_standard-
deviation, res)
0.07 0.00 0.09 0.06
Note: the structure of the applied model was as follows: ∆ln(rd–rDE )t = α∆ln(rd–rDE )t–1 + ω + β∆DCCd-DE,t + γ∆σd,t + δdummyESM,t + 
μdummyIMF,t + θ∆lnECBt + εt. Where ∆ln(rd–rDE )t  is the logarithmic change of the yield premium over German sovereign bonds, ω is the 
constant, ∆DCCd-DE,t is the change of the dynamic conditional correlation, γ∆σd,t is the change of conditional standard deviation, the fact 
that ESM or earlier EFSF sources were used is expressed with the dummy variable δdummyESM,t, the IMF funds are expressed with the 
dummy variable μdummyIMF,t, ∆lnECBt  is the logarithmic change of the amount of sovereign bonds in the balance sheet of the ECb, and 
εt  is the error term. If p<0.1 then *, p<0.05 then **, p<0.01 then ***.      
The d_DCC and d_standarddeviation variables are uncorrelated with the error terms of the regression, so there is no endogeneity bias.
Source: edited by the authors, Gretl
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samples covering the whole eurozone and the 
eFsF-esM programme countries, meaning 
they are sufficiently robust.
SUMMaRy
in our study, we compared the operation of 
the esM and the iMF, based on their crisis 
management in the eurozone. We explored 
institutional differences and the different 
financing channels, and we provided a 
brief description of the background of the 
financing facilities provided to the countries 
in the programme. Then we used bond market 
data to analyse how the allocation of eFsF-
esM funds influenced the change of the yield 
premia over the German benchmark.
We established that the esM programme 
acted against bond market divergence, the 
yield premium over German sovereign bonds 
decreased, and their co-movement increased, 
which is a precondition of a monetary poli-
cy that covers the whole euro area. With these 
measures the no-default rule, on which the eu-
rozone is based and which is the financial man-
ifestation of solidarity as presented in the op-
timum currency area theory, was sustainable, 








3 Which replaced the european Financial stabili-
sation Mechanism established in 2010 (Council 
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15 The yield premium was logarithmised to improve 
the scalability of the output, and in 98.5 percent 
of cases, it had a positive value. For the other 1.5 
percent of cases, mostly from 2006, we used zero 
values.
16 time series on the side of the esM contain too 
discrete capital movements, and they are difficult 
to fit in a time series with monthly or quarterly 
data.
17 The correlation of the conditional standard devia-
tion obtained from the two models is 0.9991.
18 This result is somewhat counterintuitive, but it 
subsisted when the model was run with different 
sets of variables (e.g. without the iMF dummy), so 
probably it is because the surge in the conditional 
standard deviation coincided with the decrease in 
yields, which underlines the necessity to use the 
asymmetric GARCH model.
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